into the United Kingdom (UK). Within the EU, the UK has a relatively significant stock of inward FDI, having reached 61% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2017 and risen strongly since 2005. The exit of the UK from the EU and the Single Market will probably
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The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the Internet on its website at: http://www.bde.es. result in reduced FDI amongst both investment destinations. The aim of this study is to look at the "real-time" effects of the Brexit June 2016 referendum outcome and its aftermath on UK-related FDI activity. Although FDI flows are notably volatile and biased by periodic non-systematic outliers, and despite some caveats on data sources and availability of time series data, we find tentative evidence of a post-referendum slowdown in gross FDI flows between the UK and the EU, notably involving the big EU economies and Ireland.
Regarding a very favoured form of FDI, greenfield FDI, we document a post-referendum fall in announced projects and capital expenditures into the UK by both other EU countries as well as one of the most important non-EU partners, the United States.
A different approach is also used to analyse the Brexit effect on FDI activity, based on estimating the effect of two successive stages in the European integration process -EU membership and the Euro area launch -and considering Brexit effects as the reversal of the UK integration into the EU. By using a fixed-effect gravity model to estimate the effects of these integration processes on bilateral FDI activity with the UK, the empirical results suggest that, on the one hand, this country played a role as a gateway for a set of international investor countries outside the Euro area to enter European markets and, on the other, it acted as a hub that reallocated these inflows and those coming from Euro countries across the Euro area itself. Thus the disconnection of the UK from the EU may have further implications for FAI than just reverting the effect of EU membership. Larger trade barriers and lower integration between the UK and the Euro area countries' markets will likely have a negative impact on FDI activity in the UK and might have, in the short run, a negative effect in the Euro area.
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Resumen
La integración en la Unión Europea (UE) ha impulsado la inversión extranjera directa (IED) hacia el Reino Unido, que mantiene un stock relativamente importante de entradas en forma de IED. Este ha aumentado notablemente desde 2005, alcanzando el 61% de su producto interior bruto (PIB) en 2017. La salida del Reino Unido de la UE y del Mercado Único probablemente resultará en flujos de IED más reducidos entre ambos destinos de inversión.
El objetivo de este estudio es examinar los efectos que el resultado del referéndum del brexit, de junio de 2016, ha podido tener en la actividad de IED relacionada con el Reino Unido.
Si bien los flujos de IEA son notablemente volátiles, con presencia de un gran número de valores atípicos, y con la cautela precisa por la escasa disponibilidad de datos temporales posteriores al referéndum, el análisis encuentra cierta evidencia de una disminución en los flujos brutos de IED entre el Reino Unido y la UE con posterioridad al referéndum. Esto se evidencia, en particular, en el caso de las grandes economías de la UE y en el de Irlanda.
Con respecto a una forma particular de IED, inversión en nuevos proyectos (greenfield IED), se encuentra evidencia de un descenso en proyectos anunciados y gastos de capital en el Reino Unido por parte de otros países de la UE en el período posterior al referéndum, así como en la inversión proveniente de Estados Unidos, uno de los socios más importantes no pertenecientes a la UE.
Para analizar el efecto de brexit en la actividad de IED, se utiliza también un enfoque diferente, basado en estimar el efecto que tuvieron sobre la inversión exterior dos etapas del proceso de integración europea: la adhesión a la UE de los distintos Estados miembros y el comienzo de la moneda única en la zona del euro. La hipótesis que subyace es que los efectos del brexit pueden considerarse como la reversión del proceso de integración del Reino Unido en la UE.
El análisis utiliza un modelo de gravedad de efectos fijos para estimar los efectos de estos procesos de integración en la actividad de IED bilateral con el Reino Unido. Los resultados empíricos sugieren que este país desempeñó, por un lado, un papel como puerta de entrada para un conjunto de países inversores internacionales, fuera de la zona del euro, para entrar en los mercados europeos y, por otro lado, actuó como un centro que reasignó estas entradas y las provenientes de los países del euro entre toda la zona del euro. Por tanto, la desconexión del Reino Unido de la UE puede tener implicaciones para la IED que van más allá de la mera reversión de los flujos de IED que, en promedio, se han derivado de la incorporación de un país a la UE. Las mayores barreras comerciales y una menor integración entre el Reino Unido y los mercados de los países de la zona del euro probablemente tendrán un impacto negativo en la actividad de IED en el Reino Unido y podrían tener, a corto plazo, también un efecto negativo en la zona del euro.
Palabras clave: inversión exterior directa, pertenencia a la UE, moneda única, brexit.
Códigos JEL: F15, F21.
Introduction and relevance
It is well established that foreign direct investment (FDI) is a source of economic growth and jobs. FDI increases productivity, boosts capital allocation and is a crucial link in global value chains.
In addition, it improves competition, trade, innovation and technology transfer. Furthermore, it is seen as a more robust form of international capital fl ows. FDI provides a means for creating direct, stable and long-lasting links between economies. FDI is thus a category of crossborder investment made by a resident in one economy (the direct investor) with the objective of establishing a lasting interest in an enterprise (the direct investment enterprise) resident in an economy other than the one of the direct investor. The motivation of the direct investor is a strategic long-term relationship with the direct investment enterprise to ensure a signifi cant degree of infl uence by the direct investor in the management of the direct investment enterprise.
The "lasting" interest is evidenced when the direct investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the direct investment enterprise. 1 This may involve either creating an entirely new enterprise (so-called "greenfi eld" investment) or, more typically, changing the ownership of existing enterprises (via mergers and acquisitions). Other types of fi nancial transactions between related enterprises, like reinvesting the earnings of the FDI enterprise or other capital transfers, are also defi ned as FDI.
According to the recent trends in EU capital fl ows, 2 net cross-border investment in the EU remained negative in 2016 and the fi rst three quarters of 2017 with outward FDI larger than inward investment. The EU remained the most-targeted investment destination globally in 2017 through extra-EU mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of European companies, although it is expected to be overtaken by the US with regard to greenfi eld investments. In contrast to the rest of the world, cross-border M&A continued to increase in the EU in 2017 due to intra-EU activity.
For the fi rst time since the crisis, intra-EU acquisitions were higher than extra-EU acquisitions with the latter still remaining at a high level, but declining due to lower infl ows from the US. Global greenfi eld FDI showed a signifi cant decline in 2017 due to a general decrease across the EU of investments from outside, whilst intra-EU investments remained.
European integration has actually boosted cross-border FDI fl ows. Studies that recently have revisited the effect of EU integration on FDI infl ows estimate that EU membership boosted inward FDI fl ows strongly. An econometric exercise using a gravity model and an EU dummy (see below) confi rms that EU membership increased cross-border FDI fl ows and stocks. Bruno et al (2016) found that joining the EU raised FDI infl ows by on average 28%. 3 This fi gure is in the ballpark of results in other studies. Likewise, it is to be expected that leaving the EU and the Single Market will have negative effects on FDI infl ows into the UK. The UK becomes a less attractive investment destination if, amongst other factors, its trading relationship with the EU becomes signifi cantly restricted and net migration falls. 4 Some restrictions on FDI fl ows do exist, as is documented by the OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index Nevertheless, internationally, the European FDI restrictions are amongst the lowest in the world. As the UK is sending signals that it wants to eliminate regulations, it is not to be expected that it will increase FDI restrictions post-Brexit. 5 We thank the ECB for data assistance on intra-EU and OECD for extra-EU FDI data. Although FDI fl ows are notably volatile and biased by periodic non-systematic outliers, and that some caveats on data sources and availability of (still too early) time series data may be identifi ed, tentative evidence is found of a post-referendum slowdown in gross FDI fl ows from big EU economies and Ireland into the UK.
In an attempt to clean the data for one-offs, we separated the four biggest Euro area economies, Germany, France, Italy and Spain ( Figure 5 ). Interestingly, a Brexit effect seems 6 Data source for this section: ECB. Please refer to the Annex for methodological and compilation issues regarding the measurement of FDI. billion, up to 2017Q4). In the last three quarters of our sample period, there is a clear recover to an average of EUR 10 billion, whereas for the EU-27 the trend is downwards. Gross FDI flows from the UK to the Big 4 also seem to be affected by the referendum outcome. They averaged EUR 5 billion before and EUR 2 billion after the referendum.
Another interesting case is Ireland, which is estimated to be the most strongly impacted We complement this exercise with an extra-EU perspective. It is possible that Brexit makes the UK a less attractive FDI destination for non-EU investors, for the reasons mentioned above (losing EU Passport and access to Single Market, disruption in value chains). We make use of OECD data on bilateral FDI fl ows of OECD countries vis-à-vis the UK. Data are yearly and only available by the end of year t+1. The fi nal year of data production is 2017, therefore only one full post-referendum year is presented and thus any possible Brexit-related effects could only so far be visible for that year.
Regarding fl ows, it is early to distil a "referendum effect" in 2016 and 2017. Bilateral FDI fl ows from various other non-EU OECD countries increased in 2016 with respect to 2015, but fell again in 2017. This is evidenced for the US in Figure 7 . For Japan, the other big non-EU investor in the UK, a similar pattern emerges.
7 Data source for this section: OECD.
SOURCE: ECB. IRELAND VIS-À-VIS UK FDI FLOWS SOURCE: OCDE. We make use of the FDI Markets database, a service by the Financial Times which is the leading standard regarding greenfield FDI trends. 9 Although concerns exist pertaining to the reliability of the data, 10 we have no evidence of a more timely or robust indicator regarding greenfield FDI trends.
Regarding European flows to the UK, we observe a decline in announced greenfield This post-referendum decline is also visible in data on US greenfield FDI into the EU and UK. 11 The relative share of the UK as a destination of US greenfield FDI capital expenditure into the EU fell from 46% pre-referendum (2015) to 32% post-referendum (2017). In addition, a decline in the share of announced projects is documented ( Figure 10 ). A similar decline in planned capital expenditure was observed in 2012-13 (euro crisis). One could take into account that Brexit-induced uncertainty not only led to a fall in foreign direct investment, but perhaps also hurt overseas companies (and economies) with exposure to the UK, to the extent that the strong negative effects identified on capital investment and employment decisions of UK-exposed
American firms is only one of the many channels through which uncertainty is transmitted across 8 According to the current version of the OECD Benchmark Definition of FDI (BD4), these are the four types of operation that qualify as FDI. 9
We follow the rationale provided by the European Political Strategy Center in the Greenfield Investment Monitor (see, for example, Issue 2 in July 2017). 10 Data collected by FDI Markets are announcements of investments by companies, a method which has been criticized by statisticians, because these are announcements, not effective FDI operations. 11 The US is the biggest (greenfield) FDI investor into the EU, responsible for 60% of inward greenfield FDI in 2017Q1. 3 An econometric exercise: The "Brexit effect" on foreign direct investment in the UK and the EU countries
Estimating the Brexit effect on FDI
As noted above, the formation of the EU coincided with increased FDI activity, while (the anticipation of) Brexit seems to reduce it. We complement the aforementioned "real-time"
fi ndings with an econometric gravity exercise. Indeed, Brexit effects may be viewed as the reversal of the consequences of the UK integration into the EU. Though it is far from clear that the outcome of both processes were to be symmetric, the most widely used approach to assess its effects is based on the estimated impact of EU membership since there is no previous case of a country withdrawal from the EU.
The impact of free trade agreements -or economic agreements which reduce barriers to trade -on foreign direct investment (FDI) is theoretically ambiguous since it is usually linked to the nature or motivation for this investment. According to the literature, there are mainly two different types of foreign direct investment: vertical investment takes place when multi-plants fragment production into different stages located in different areas (frequently taking advantage of differences in factor prices across countries) and horizontal investment, which is adopted by multi-plant fi rms that produce similar goods or services in different countries -possibly as a result of a decision to replace exports to these markets with 
Empirical strategy and data
The standard gravity model specifi cation includes indicators of country size and "distance" variables as in the following equation:
where lnFDI ijt denotes FDI fl ows (in logs) from the country of origin "i" (i.e. capital exporter) to the country of destination "j" (i.e. capital importer) at time t; FTA is a dummy that identifi es country pairs with a free trade agreement in place; lnDistance ij is a set of distance variables (geographic, cultural, other) between country i and country j. These are usually time-invariant characteristics that may be correlated with the likelihood of forming an FTA and if some of them were omitted in the specifi cation, estimates of β1 could be biased.
Therefore the most recent approaches include country-pair fi xed-effects 15 to absorb all these time-invariant characteristics and control for country-pair unobserved heterogeneity (η ij is the country-pair fi xed-effect): estimating β1 in the same way as with time-invariant characteristics and, in the framework of structural gravity models, these fi xed-effects also give account of multilateral resistance terms. 16 Our basic specifi cation uses this latter approach:
EU variables have been added to estimate the effect of EU membership on FDI. EU ijt is a dummy which takes value 1 when both countries are member states of the European Union 
Estimation results
The results of estimating equation (3) for both inward fl ows and stocks are presented in This alternative is also suggested in UNCTAD and WTO (2016). 19 According to the OECD, FDI fi nancial transactions may be negative if there is disinvestment, the parent borrowed money from its affi liate or reinvested earnings are negative. Negative FDI positions largely result when the loans from the affi liate to its parent exceed the loans and equity capital given by the parent to the affi liate (please see the Annex for further explanation).
the effect of EU membership but that information is not always consistent with each other due to statistical measurement issues. 20 Therefore we use both datasets to check the robustness of the results.
The coefficient of the EU dummy is positive and significant in three of the four estimates. The effect of EU membership 21 is an average increase of (intra EU)
FDI inflows close to 40% and higher on stocks (about 80%). The estimates on stocks are higher than those obtained previously 22 while the impact on inflows is similar to those estimated in other studies. 23 The existence of a FTA also increases FDI inflows in a similar magnitude to EU membership but it seems to be a short lived effect since there is no significant impact on stocks. There has not been a significant impact on FDI inflows to the UK from other EU countries, but the entrance of new members have increased the outflows from the UK. This latter estimate suggests the UK plays a role as a platform for FDI flows into EU members.
The effect of a further step in the European integration process is considered in EU: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of the EU, except when the UK is involved. EU_uk_r: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if UK is the reporting country and the partner is a EU member. EU_uk_p: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if UK is the partner country and the reporting one is a EU member. FTA: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of a free trade agreement. Standard errors in brackets, robust (cluster reporting country). Stars indicate statistical significance levels: *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
(1)
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) EU: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of the EU, except when the UK is involved. EU_uk_r: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the reporting country and the partner is a EU member. EU_uk_p: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the partner country and the reporting one is a EU member. EMU, EMU_uk_r and EMU_uk_p: similar definitions for EMU members at the launch date (1999). out_EMU_r : dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country was an EMU member in 1999 and the partner country is out of EMU (11 countries which are the largest investors in UK). out_EMU_p: dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the partner country was an EMU member in 1999 and the reporting country is out of EMU (in a group 11 countries). out_EMU_uk_r: equals 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country is UK and the partner is a non-EMU country (in the group of 11 countries). out_EMU_uk_p: equals 1 (since 1999) if the partner country is UK and the reporting one is a non-EMU country (11 countries). FTA: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of a free trade agreement. countries outside the region to enter European markets. To explore both the effects on intra-Euro FDI fl ows and on those with non-Euro countries, additional dummies are included in the gravity equations. One variable for Euro membership at the starting year (1999) 25 and two dummies for the potential impact on bilateral FDI between the UK and Euro members (one identifi es observations when the UK is a reporting country and the other when the UK is a partner country) allow to capture intra-Euro effects, as well as the possible UK role as a platform for increased FDI activity around the Euro area creation. Four additional variables give account of possible extended market effects on FDI into Euro countries and into the UK from a set of countries outside the Euro area that are the largest international or global investors in the British economy. 26 The impact of EU membership on FDI infl ows is confi rmed in these new estimates (Table 2) , as well as the effect of having signed a free trade agreement. The results in Table 2 do not point, however, to a particular effect on FDI fl ows among starting Euro members, neither with infl ow nor outfl ow data. This is a controversial issue in the empirical literature. 27 As argued in several analyses, there is a considerable overlap between the countries participating in the Single Market and EU membership and those integrating the Euro. This usually gives rise to collinearity and identifi cation problems in estimations. On the other hand, a signifi cant positive effect on UK infl ows from Euro members is found which suggests the Euro had a relevant impact on the UK even though this country was not a member of the single currency, possibly due to its deep and developed fi nancial markets. The coeffi cient of outfl ows from the UK to Euro members is close to be signifi cant at 10% level. Lastly, infl ows from non-Euro countries (most of them out of the EU) into the UK were also increased, pointing to some kind of extended market effect on the UK from the creation of the Euro area. Interestingly, countries participating in the single currency did not seem to have benefi ted from this extended market effect, which is in line with fi ndings of Sousa and Lochard (2011) . A set of similar specifi cations was also estimated for stock data, being signifi cant a smaller number of effects as in Table 1 estimations. The coeffi cients are rather similar but their standard errors are larger, possibly due to a higher persistence and a smaller number of observations in stocks data.
To give account of the likelihood of positive fi gures and the selection bias that might arise, the previous gravity equations were estimated by using a Heckman selection model for fl ows data (table 3). In the selection equation the regressors are the EU and FTA dummies, PIB per capita (partner country) and a proxy variable of the entry costs of investing in foreign countries -the number of time periods in the sample with FDI activity for each country-pair -, which is supposed to infl uence the likelihood of a country starting direct investment into a foreign country but not its intensity or magnitude. This exclusion restriction is required for the Heckman model to be properly applied.
EU: dummy variable which is equal to 1 if both reporting and partner countries are members of the EU, except when the UK is involved. EU_uk_r: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the reporting country and the partner is a EU member. EU_uk_p: dummy variable equal to 1 if UK is the partner country and the reporting one is a EU member. EMU, EMU_uk_r and EMU_uk_p: similar definitions for EMU members at the launch date (1999). out_EMU_r : dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country was an EMU member in 1999 and the partner country is out of EMU (11 countries which are the largest investors in UK). out_EMU_p: dummy variable equal to 1 (since 1999) if the partner country was an EMU member in 1999 and the reporting country is out of EMU (group of 11 countries). out_EMU_uk_r: equals 1 (since 1999) if the reporting country is UK and the partner is a non-EMU country (in the group of 11 countries). out_EMU_uk_p: equals 1 (since 1999) if the partner country is UK and the reporting one is a non-EMU country (11 countries). Most of the previous estimations results are also obtained with this new procedure that, in general, yields higher values for most of the signifi cant coeffi cients, thus suggesting a negative bias in the previous estimates. 28 The most relevant difference in the Heckman estimates presented in Table 3 refers to the relationship between the UK and the single currency members. Signifi cant and positive coeffi cients are estimated both for UK infl ows from and outfl ows into Euro area member countries. These signifi cant effects are obtained with both the infl ow and outfl ow databases. 29 The assumption that the UK has played an important role as a hub that reallocates FDI across Euro members seems to be highly supported by the data. This role of the UK as a hub has also involved FDI from the set of the largest international investors in the British economy above referred. Not only the UK acted as a gateway to enter Euro countries' markets, as detected in the coeffi cients in Table 2 , but also signifi cant positive effects are obtained for the UK outfl ows into this set of global investors. A second difference is a signifi cant positive impact on intra-Euro FDI fl ows according to the outfl ows information, though this effect is not signifi cant with infl ows data. Finally, the launch of the EMU seems to have boosted FDI outfl ows from Euro members into outside the region, while there was not additional FDI brought into the Euro area. 30 Nonetheless, an indirect impact came up through the UK, which received increased infl ows from global investors and reallocated them across Euro area members.
Conclusions
Countries joining the EU experience an increase in inward FDI fl ows, an effect found in other studies. UK leaving the EU and the Single Market will likely result in reduced FDI activity between the EU and the UK. In order to try to ascertain the potential Brexit effect on European countries, the analysis presented in this note tries to pay closer attention to the bilateral effects on fl ows between the UK and other EU countries as well as between the UK and Euro area members.
Post-referendum developments in FDI vis-à-vis the UK show evidence of a slowdown in gross FDI fl ows from the four biggest EU economies into the UK, as well as a fall in greenfi eld FDI projects announced by EU countries and the US. Estimates of the European integration effect on FDI based on historical data and gravity models suggest that EU membership increased intra-EU FDI fl ows, but the evidence on a signifi cant single currency effect on Euro area countries is not robust across different estimates.
The empirical results of the gravity model highly support a positive impact of the single currency launch on the infl ows into the UK and its outfl ows vis-à-vis Euro countries.
The gravity equations also point to an extended market effect which increased FDI into the UK from a set of countries outside the Euro area that are global investors. It appears 28 The existence of correlation in the residuals of the gravity and selection equations ( 
FDI according to the directional principle
The typical direction of direct investment is from the direct investor to its direct investment enterprise.
However, there may also be fl ows in the reverse direction (when the direct investment enterprise invests or lends funds to its direct investor, but owing less than 10% of its equity, which are then equivalent to the withdrawal of investment) and between fellow enterprises. Massive investment fl ows into and out of a country may not be of primary interest to analysts of direct investment if they refl ect merely a pass-through or round-tripping of direct investment funds. Therefore, users seeking to analyse the economic impact of FDI from the perspective of the direction of infl uence/control would rather focus on investments recorded according to the directional principle both for transactions and positions. Under the directional principle, direct investment is shown as either direct investment abroad (outward) or direct investment in the reporting economy (inward).
FDI statistics compiled according to the directional principle show outward investments and inward investments taking into account reverse investments (i.e.) as well as investment into fellow enterprises -the direction in the latter case depending on whether the ultimate controlling parent of the resident fellow enterprise is a resident or a non-resident of the compiling economy.
Data on both the asset and liability presentation and the directional principle presentation are useful for different kinds of analysis. The directional principle is a presentation of direct investment data organized according to the direction of the direct investment relationship.
It can be contrasted with the asset and liability presentation of aggregates used in standard components of the 6th edition of the IMF Balance of Payments and International Investment
Position Manual, which are organized according to whether the investment relates to an asset or liability. In this Manual, the directional presentation appears as supplementary items, since the standard presentation for FDI under BOP relies on the asset/liability basis. The difference between the asset-liability and the directional presentations arises from differences in the treatment of reverse investment and some investment between fellow enterprises, however the FDI total net position for both presentations should be the same.
FDI fi nancial transactions may be negative for three reasons. First, if there is disinvestment in assets -that is, the direct investor sells its interest in a direct investment enterprise to a third party or back to the direct investment enterprise. Second, if the parent borrowed money from its affi liate or if the affi liate paid off a loan from its direct investor. Third, if reinvested earnings are negative. Reinvested earnings are negative if the affi liate loses money or if the dividends paid out to the direct investor are greater than the income recorded in that period. Negative FDI positions largely result when the loans from the affi liate to its parent exceed the loans and equity capital given by the parent to the affi liate. This is most likely to occur when FDI statistics are presented on a directional basis and by partner country.
Apart from these methodological issues, some caveats on data sources, compilation practices and periodicity and timeliness of availability of FDI time series data may be identifi ed, illustrating the somehow uneasy task of collecting FDI bilateral statistics internationally comparable and readily available in a short period of time.
The IMF publishes data for FDI fl ows and stocks within the BOP/IIP framework. These are national data not broken down by counterparty country. The geographical details for FDI stocks are only collected via the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). The CDIS is an annual exercise that collects data on FDI stocks at the end of each year (starting with data corresponding to end-2009) with counterparty information received from more than 100 economies. All participants in the CDIS report data on their inward direct investment and most participants also provide data on their outward direct investment. This is the statistical output made available by the IMF where bilateral FDI stocks fi gures reported by each country vis-à-vis each other specifi c country, may be gathered.
The ECB collects and publishes statistics of BOP/IIP, including the FDI component, for the Euro area countries as a whole, following the asset/liability principle, on a quarterly basis.
For additional information broken down by geography, the OECD collects such FDI fi nancial items by partner country, but not on a quarterly basis, only on an annual basis.The results are typically available by the end of the following year. Bilateral OECD FDI statistics are presented on a directional basis, not on an asset/liability basis. Also bilateral FDI fl ows and stocks related to inward and outward FDI vis-à-vis a certain country are available on an immediate counterpart country basis, while ultimate investing country FDI positions are also available but for a few countries.
